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Abstract—We use direct evidence on credit constraints to study their impor-
tance for household consumption growth and for welfare. We distentangle
the direct effect on consumption growth of a currently binding credit con-
straint from the indirect effect of a potentially binding credit constraint that
generates consumption risk. Our data are focused on job losers. We find
that less than 5% of job losers experience a binding credit constraint, but
those who do experience significant welfare losses, and consumption growth
is 24% higher than for the rest of the population. However, even among
those who are unconstrained and are able to borrow if needed, consumption
responds to transitory income.
I. Introduction
CREDIT constraints faced by households have poten-tially important implications for efficacy of monetary
and fiscal stimulus, the impact of transitory shocks, and more
broadly for welfare and growth. As a result, the incidence
and impact of such constraints is an empirical question of
long-standing and continued importance (Hall & Mishkin,
1982; Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli, Piske, & Soule-
les, 1998; Gross & Souleles, 2002; Leth-Petersen, 2010). A
key challenge in this literature is that researchers rarely have
direct observations on whether credit constraints are binding,
and thus must typically infer the incidence of credit con-
straints from observed behavior, such as individuals’ holding
no liquid assets or the responsiveness of consumption to
transitory shocks. This inference may be misleading and con-
clusions about the impact of credit constraints misstated. In
this paper, we resolve this problem using an unusual Cana-
dian survey of job losers that collects direct data on credit
constraints, along with data on consumption growth and sub-
jective experiences of financial hardship. The analysis of the
impact of credit constraints using these data is particularly
interesting for three reasons.
First, the data are unusually rich: the same individuals
are asked about credit constraints and broad consumption
choices. In the work most similar to this paper, Jappelli et
al. (1998) use two-sample instrumental-variable methods to
combine data on food expenditure from the PSID with mea-
sures of credit constraints from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). Jappelli et al. argue that this combination
of data provides a superior test for credit constraints rela-
tive to splitting a sample based on the presence of liquid
asset holdings, as employed by Zeldes (1989) and Runkle
(1991), and, more recently, by Dynarksi and Gruber (1997),
Ziliak (1998), Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), and
Leth-Peterson (2010). Our data contain the same measures
Received for publication July 8, 2011. Revision accepted for publication
May 14, 2013. Editor: Mark W. Watson.
* Crossley: Koc University, University of Essex, and Institute for Fiscal
Studies; Low: University of Cambridge and Institute for Fiscal Studies.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to seminar participants at the Easter
2011 workshop of the Centre for Financial Analysis and Policy. For finan-
cial support, we thank the Social Science Humanities Research Council of
Canada.
of credit constraints as the SCF data studied by Jappelli et al.,
along with an alternative set of questions that asks directly
about ability and desire to borrow at a point in time. Fur-
ther, the same data contain measures of consumption growth,
eliminating the need for two-sample procedures, and our data
measure not only food expenditure but also total household
expenditure. There is good evidence that food consumption
is preferentially smoothed in the face of transitory income
shocks (Browning & Crossley, 2009) and so total expenditure
provides a more convincing test of the impact of credit con-
straints. The same data include, in addition to direct measures
of credit constraints and multiple measures of consumption
growth, data on the subjective experience of financial hard-
ship. Thus, we observe the complete chain from constraints,
to behavior, to (subjectively experienced) welfare.
The second reason that our analysis is of interest is that
we can address the questions of how much consumption
smoothing occurs after job loss, how this is affected by credit
constraints, and the value of unemployment insurance. This is
related to the literature on the marginal propensity to consume
out of current or transitory income: Browning and Crossley
(2001) report that the marginal propensity to consume out
of unemployment benefit income varies between 0 and .25
for different groups, where the groups are defined by fam-
ily type and financial wealth. Sullivan (2008) and Bloemen
and Stancanelli (2005), using measures of food consumption
in U.S. and U.K. data, respectively, also document signif-
icant variation in the marginal propensity to consume out
of current income across job losers with different wealth
levels. Those without (liquid) assets are considered to be
more likely to be constrained, and the fact that they have
a higher marginal propensity to consume out of current
income is taken to be confirmation of binding borrowing
constraints.
This interpretation should be viewed with caution, how-
ever. As Jappelli (1990) and Jappelli et al. (1998) empha
sized, asset levels are an imprecise measure of credit con-
straints. While those who carry forward liquid assets are
clearly not currently constrained, they may be unable to
borrow if they needed to and therefore have a stronger pre-
cautionary motive because of this potential constraint. As
Carroll (2001) emphasized, this can lead to greater buffer
stock holdings of wealth against income uncertainty. Further,
the absence of assets does not necessarily imply a binding
constraint; for example, it may reflect impatience or high
current needs. Zeldes (1989) recognized at a theoretical level
this distinction between a currently binding constraint and
a potentially binding constraint. Gross and Souleles (2002)
acknowledge that their evidence can partially be explained
by a precautionary motive caused by a potential constraint.
Leth-Petersen (2010) identifies consumption growth in Den-
mark as being due to a change in credit conditions, but without
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taking a stand on whether this is a direct effect or a precaution-
ary effect. Our paper addresses this issue directly. We have
direct measures both of whether individuals are currently con-
strained as well as whether they have the ability to borrow
should they need to. Our direct measures of the availability of
credit also allow us to assess how closely binding constraints
are associated with zero wealth holdings, and they allow us
to test whether consumption growth is associated with low
assets or associated with a binding constraint.
The final reason this survey of job losers is of interest is
that recent job losers are likely to be more credit constrained
than the general population. Employment status is a key crite-
rion that lenders consider, and investments in future earnings
(either human capital or job search) are not collateralizable. A
survey of job losers therefore increases our chances of finding
evidence of credit constraints.
We find that a quarter of recent job losers could not borrow
to raise current consumption. A smaller fraction (less than
5%) reports that this constraint is binding: they would like
to borrow but cannot. A binding credit constraint is likely
to lead to more responsiveness to current income, and we
show that those who experience a binding credit constraint
exhibit significantly higher subsequent consumption growth
than other job losers and are much more likely to report that
the job loss was a financial hardship. Further, once we con-
trol for the presence of a binding constraint, assets have no
significant effect on consumption growth.
By contrast, we show that even those who are able to
borrow are responsive to current income and display excess
sensitivity in consumption growth. While this result shows
that the presence of binding credit constraints is not the com-
plete story behind the response of consumption to current
income, the magnitude of the response to current income
among those able to borrow is substantially less than the effect
on consumption growth of a binding constraint. This high-
lights that the important failures to smooth consumption are
largely among a small number of job losers who experience
a binding constraint. For these job losers, the welfare costs
are substantial.
The next section outlines the theoretical framework that
motivates our analysis. Section III describes our data. Section
III presents our results, and section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
We take a standard intertemporal optimization problem
of a consumer (with stationary and intertemporally additive
preferences), who faces a borrowing constraint:1
At+1 ≥ A
¯
.
1 For simplicity, we consider a borrowing constraint as being on the quan-
tity that individuals can borrow. Alternatively, a constraint may be through
the price that individuals can borrow at.
This yields the first-order condition:
∂u
∂ct
− μt = βREt
[
∂u
∂ct+1
− μt+1
]
= βREt
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
.
(1)
Consumption is given by ct and assets by At; β is the subjec-
tive discount factor, and R reflects the market rate of return;
u denotes the per period utility (or “felicity”) function; V
denotes a value function; and μt is the multiplier on the bor-
rowing constraint. Equation (1) says that the marginal utility
of consumption today (on the left) differs from the expected
future marginal value of assets (on the right) by the multi-
plier (μt > 0). The value of μt depends on the amount of
resources (cash-in-hand or income) available in that period.
A binding credit constraint raises marginal utility and low-
ers consumption, today. Consumption growth (e.g., from a
period of unemployment into a period of employment) is
consistent with the relaxing of a binding credit constraint
(μt > μt+1). However, it can also be attributed to consid-
erations on the right-hand side of equation (1). First, if the
market rate of return exceeds the subjective discount factor
so that βR > 1, marginal utility falls over time and, hence,
consumption rises. Second, because of the concavity of the
felicity (and value) function, uncertainty about future con-
sumption lowers expected marginal utility and so generates
consumption growth. To see the latter effect more clearly, we
assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences
and that βR = 1, and we derive an expression for consump-
tion growth. Note that we can write both one-period-ahead
and two-period-ahead Euler equations:
(ct)
−γ − μt = Et
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
,
(ct−1)−γ − μt−1 = Et−1
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
,
so that
(
ct
ct−1
)−γ
=
Et
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
+ μt
Et−1
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
+ μt−1
and:
log ct − log ct−1 = −1
γ
[
log
(
Et
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
+ μt
)
− log
(
Et−1
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
+ μt−1
)]
.
Consumption growth will respond to changes (between t − 1
and t) in the multiplier on the borrowing constraint and to
changes (between t − 1 and t) in the expectation of the mar-
ginal value of wealth at t+1, and subsequent dates. Recalling
878 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
that ∂Vt+1
∂At+1 = ∂u∂ct+1 − μt+1 = c
−γ
t+1 − μt+1 gives
log ct − log ct−1 = −1
γ
[
log
(
Et
[
c
−γ
t+1 − μt+1
] + μt)
− log (Et−1 [c−γt+1 − μt+1] + μt−1)] ,
and, taking a first-order approximation around values at t−1,
log ct − log ct−1
≈ − 1
γc
−γ
t−1
(
Et
[
c
−γ
t+1 − μt+1
] − Et−1 [c−γt+1 − μt+1]
+μt − μt−1
)
.
(2)
Consumption growth will be higher for individuals who
face a binding borrowing constraint in period t − 1 (i.e.,
μt−1 > 0). Consumption growth will also be affected by
any change (between t − 1 and t) in the expectation of the
future marginal value of assets
(
Et−1
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
]
to Et
[
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
])
.
A decrease in the expected marginal value of assets decreases
the benefit of deferring spending further into the future,
consumption in period t rises, and consumption growth is
faster. The expected marginal value of assets depends on
the expected future value of the multiplier on the borrow-
ing constraint, μt+1, and so consumption growth increases in
response to a decrease in the perceived probability that the
borrowing constraint will bind in the future. Of course, con-
sumption growth will also respond to any other factors that
change the expected marginal value of wealth.
We can consider within this framework the effect of a credit
market liberalization.2 For households that, in the absence
of the liberalization, faced binding constraints, consumption
after the liberalization will boom, leading to faster consump-
tion growth through the liberalization. In terms of equation
(2), this is the effect of a reduction in μt . However, finan-
cial liberalization has another effect on consumption growth:
relaxing the probability of credit constraints binding at some
point in the future. In equation (2), this is the updating of
expectations about the marginal value of assets in the future:
savings become less valuable (because an alternative self-
insurance mechanism is now available) and consumption will
increase even if credit constraints were not currently binding
at the time of the reform. Of course, this would not occur in
an environment in which there was no possibility of a binding
credit constraint. Evidence that financial liberalization leads
to a consumption boom therefore establishes only that the
possibility of a (current or future) binding credit constraint
was a feature of the economic environment. For example,
Leth-Peterson (2010) finds evidence of a consumption boom
(albeit small) following financial liberalization in Denmark
but remains agnostic as to the relative importance of these
two channels. This point is similar to the more general argu-
ment in section I: a high marginal propensity to consume out
2 Here we focus on the immediate (transition) effects of a liberalization.
Of course, in the steady state, a more liberal credit market will be associated
with smoother consumption than otherwise.
of those with low liquid assets does not necessarily mean that
constraints are currently binding.
For our analysis, the key implication is that there are
two possible sources of rapid consumption growth among
recent job losers: (a) the relaxation of currently binding credit
constraints and (b) the resolution of uncertainty over future
resources in general, and, in particular, over the possibility of
being credit constrained in the future. In our empirical work,
we have direct measures both of whether individuals are cur-
rently constrained as well as whether they have the ability to
borrow should they need to. We can therefore see whether
excess consumption growth is limited to those with currently
binding constraints or whether a lack of access to credit per
se has an impact on consumption growth.
Finally, we note that the welfare losses of failing to smooth
consumption are proportional to the square of consump-
tion growth for agents of a given age. This follows from a
standard certainty-equivalence argument (following Lucas,
1987). With βR = 1, an unconstrained and fully insured con-
sumer will choose a constant consumption stream: ct = c.
To economize on notation, set β = R = 1. Suppose now
the consumer is constrained to consume c1 = c(1 − Δ) in
the current period but will be able to maintain a smooth con-
sumption path from the next period on. The future constant
consumption path must satisfy the intertemporal budget con-
straint, so ct = c(1 + ΔT−1 ) for t = 2, 3, ..., T . Note that Δ
is approximately the consumption growth rate from t = 1 to
t = 2 (for large T or small Δ). Let δ be the fraction of the
constant consumption stream (c) that the consumer would
forgo in order to smooth consumption over all T periods:
Tu(c(1 − δ)) = u(c(1 − Δ))
+ (T − 1)u
(
c
(
1 + Δ
T − 1
))
. (3)
Assume that CRRA preferences u(c) = c1−γ1−γ , take a first-
order Taylor-series approximation around ct = c on the left-
hand side of equation (3) and a second-order approximation
around ct = c of both terms on the right-hand side. This gives
δ = 1
2
γΔ2
(
1
T − 1
)
.
Thus, among consumers with the same time horizon (T ),
which is naturally interpreted as age, the welfare loss due
to the constraint (measured as the fraction of smooth con-
sumption the consumer would forgo to have a smooth path)
is proportional to the square of subsequent consumption
growth.3 With this analysis in mind, we interpret post–job loss
consumption growth as an index of the welfare loss associated
with job loss. Because our data also contain self-reports of
the financial hardship of job loss, we are able to corroborate
this interpretation of the data.
3 This differs from the usual Lucas formula because we are considering a
single episode of failure to smooth rather than ongoing volatility.
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III. Data
The 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP)
surveyed individuals who separated from jobs in the first
half of 1995.4 Respondents were interviewed in the last quar-
ter of 1995 (around three quarters after job loss) and then
a second time five quarters after job loss. Interviews col-
lected information about respondents’ circumstances at the
interview dates and retrospectively about their circumstances
prior to the end of the relevant job and over the intervening
periods (between job separation and the first interview and
between the two interviews). Information was collected about
respondents’ work, training, and job search and about their
household composition, consumption, income, and finances.
Respondents to the survey number 7,818, but these cover
a range of job separation types, including quits, dismissals,
separations due to illness, and temporary and permanent lay-
offs. In this paper, we focus on a sample of job losers who,
at the time of job loss, were prime-aged, lived in a nuclear
family (alone, with a spouse, or spouse and children), and
were the primary earner in their household. Experience with
this data suggests that the quality of the survey responses
on household finances is lower among respondents in other
family types (e.g., living with their parents or with unrelated
adults). The job loss of primary earners is of particular inter-
est, and in focusing on primary earners, we are following
much of the previous literature (e.g., Dynarski and Gruber,
1997).
Our sample is of 2,922 individuals who lived in a nuclear
family and were the primary earners in their households. Of
these respondents, 1,659 were employed at the time of the first
interview. The other 1,263 were not working at the time of
the interview, though some of these had spells of employment
between the initial job loss and the interview.5 For those not
working at the time of the interview, monthly net household
income was on average 22% below the month prior to job loss.
A quarter reported losses of net household income in excess of
39%. These numbers reflect the replacement income offered
by the unemployment benefit system, the progressivity of
income taxes, and the fact that many households had second
earners. (For further discussion, see Browning & Crossley,
2009.)
Crucial to our analysis is the unusually good credit con-
straint measures in the 1995 COEP. The survey asked respon-
dents two sets of questions about their ability to borrow. They
were asked subjective questions about the ability and desire
to borrow at the interview date, as follows:
• “If you needed it, COULD you borrow money from
a friend, family, or a financial institution in order to
increase your household expenditures?”
4 The survey was conducted by the Special Surveys Division of Statistics
Canada; further details are available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/IPS
/Data/72M0001XCB.htm.
5 Some of our regression analyses are based on slightly smaller samples
due to the inevitable item nonresponse in a large and comprehensive survey.
If the answer to this question was negative, the respondent
was then asked:
• “Suppose you COULD borrow money from one of these
sources at 11% interest per year, to be paid back starting
in one year. WOULD you borrow money to increase
your weekly spending on household expenses?”6
A question similar to the first of these was previously posed
to low-income households in Chicago (Mayer & Jencks,
1989). We take the answers to the first question as informative
about access to credit. If a respondent says no to the first ques-
tion and yes to the second, we take that person to be reporting
that he or she faces a currently binding credit constraint.
Second, respondents were asked a series of questions
about credit applications and the outcomes of those appli-
cations over an interval of time. These questions are similar
to the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finance questions studied
by Jappelli (1990) and are as follows:
• “At any time since your job ended on [date of job loss]
did you or any member of your household apply for a
loan at a bank or financial institution, or for credit with
any credit company?” (Applied)
• “Were any of your requests for credit or a loan turned
down?” (Declined)
• “Were you, or any member of your household, given as
much credit as you applied for?” (Not full amount)
• “Were you later able to obtain the full amount you
requested by reapplying to the same institution or by
applying elsewhere?” (Got later)
• “Was there any time since [date of job loss] that you
or any member of your household thought of apply-
ing for credit at a particular place, but changed your
mind because you thought you might be turned down?”
(Discouraged)
We refer to these as the objective questions because they
refer to actual (past) events rather than to hypotheticals.7 We
now turn to an analysis of these data.
IV. Results
A. The Incidence of Credit Constraints among Job Losers
Responses to the subjective questions are summarized in
the top panel of table 1. Among respondents not working
at the time of interview, more than 30% report that they
could not borrow. The corresponding number for those back
in employment is almost 10 percentage points lower. Over-
all, about a quarter of recent job losers report no access to
6 Nominal prime interest rate at this time in Canada was about 7%.
7 A limitation of these measures is that they are discrete: either an individ-
ual is constrained or not, and the constraint is defined in terms of quantity.
In practice, credit constraints might mean differential borrowing rates, and
while individuals may report being unable to borrow at 11%, they may be
able to borrow at a higher rate. Our data cannot identify this distinction.
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Table 1.—Credit Market Access and Credit Constrained
Subjective Assessment of the Ability to Borrow
Not Employed Employed Pooled
Currently unable to borrow 31.2% 23.0% 26.5%
Currently constrained:
of those unable to borrow 13.1% 14.4% 13.8%
of sample 4.0% 3.3% 3.6%
Number of observations 1,263 1,659 2,922
Objective Assessment of the Ability to Borrow
Label Denominator Pooled
Applied for credit (1) Sample 24.4%
Declined (2) (1) 24.6%
Not full amount (3) (1)–(2) 4.5%
Got latera (4) (2) + (3) 11.6%
Constrained (A) (2) + (3) − (4) (1) 24.6%
Sample 6.0%
Discouraged (5) Nonapplicants 11.1%
Sample 8.4%
Constrained (B) (A) + (5) Sample 14.3%
Number of observations
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, first Interview (third quarter after separation from a job).
aThere are a large number of missing values to this question. We treat these as a negative response. This is
the only question to which there is significant nonresponse.
credit. Of those who report that they are unable to borrow,
only a fraction (13% among those not working) report that
they would borrow if they could. Thus, only a small fraction
of the sample report being “constrained” in the sense of a
Euler equation violation. However, as outlined in section B,
uncertainty about future employment and the possibility that
credit constraints may bind in the future may be dampening
the desire to borrow.
The bottom panel of table 1 summarizes responses to the
objective questions. About a quarter of recent job losers
applied for some kind of credit before the first interview.8
Of those, about a quarter were constrained in the sense that
their application was declined or they did not get the full
amount and they were not later able to get the full amount.
Thus, about 6% of the full sample are constrained by this
definition. Following Jappelli, we also consider a broader
definition of constrained that includes those who did not
apply because they anticipated that an application would not
be successful (the discouraged). These are about 8% of the
sample, so that about 14% of the sample are constrained by
this broader definition. In comparison, Jappelli (1990) finds
19% of households in the 1983 U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finance report being constrained in this sense over a period
of several years prior to the interview.
Figure 1 illustrates the age patterns in our measures of
credit access and credit constrained. The top panel is based
on the “subjective” questions. The sample is divided into
three age groups (26–35, 36–45, and 46–55), and each group
8 The data contain some information on the type of credit our respon-
dents applied for. Personal loans, car loans, and credit cards were the most
common. Although the respondents could list up to three different kinds
of credit, more than 90% listed only one type. Thus, we can also calculate
rough rejection rates by type of credit. These were much higher for unse-
cured debt (credit cards and consolidation loans) than for secured debt (car
loans and mortgages).
Figure 1.—Credit Status by Age
The top graph reports responses to the subjective questions on credit status. The bottom graph reports
responses to the objective questions on credit status. The subjective questions refer to status at the time of
the interview, and we split the sample by current employment status. The objective questions refer to the
whole period since job loss, and we do not condition on current employment status. The number located
above the lower section on each bar gives the size of the lower section. The number at the top of each bar
gives the total for that age group (by employment status for the top graph).
is divided into those who are and are not employed at the
time of the (first) interview. Among respondents aged 26 to
35, not in work at the interview date, 30% could not borrow
and 5% would if they could. The fraction who report that
they could not borrow falls with age among the employed
but rises with age among those not in work. The fraction who
are constrained (can’t borrow and would) falls with age for
both the employed and unemployed.
The lower panel of figure 1 is based on the “objective”
questions. We divide the sample into the same three age cat-
egories. However, as these questions refer to anytime since
the job loss, we do not divide by current employment status.
Among the youngest group, 9% experience a binding borrow-
ing constraint in the sense of being unable to obtain credit for
which they applied, while 18% report being constrained in
the broader sense of either being unable to obtain credit for
which they applied or deciding not to apply in anticipation
of the application being unsuccessful. By either the broad or
narrow measure, the incidence of (binding) borrowing con-
straints falls with age. Relative to the subjective questions,
the objective questions suggest a greater incidence of binding
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Table 2.—Characteristics of the Credit Constrained
Unable Unable to Borrow Rejected or
to Borrow and Would Discouraged
Male −0.048 (.024) 0.001 (.007) −0.001 (.017)
Age 0.040 (.019) 0.000 (.006) −0.019 (.014)
Age 45 −0.151 (.063) −0.024 (.023) −0.033 (.050)
High school −0.051 (.022) −0.015 (.007) −0.005 (.016)
University or college −0.081 (.025) −0.023 (.006) −0.052 (.018)
Spouse present −0.011 (.031) −0.006 (.010) −0.033 (.024)
Children present 0.005 (.023) 0.010 (.008) 0.017 (.017)
Visible minority 0.077 (.025) 0.021 (.010) 0.056 (.020)
Quit −0.041 (.043) 0.008 (.017) 0.00 (.034)
Fired 0.095 (.066) 0.030 (.029) 0.082 (.055)
Ill −0.061 (.041) 0.014 (.018) 0.044 (.038)
Own home −0.224 (.033) −0.075 (.022) −0.114 (.027)
Mortgage 0.111 (.032) 0.028 (.017) 0.020 (.025)
Spouse employed −0.027 (.025) −0.005 (.008) −0.026 (.019)
Liquid assets −0.105 (.020) −0.010 (.007) −0.033 (.015)
Other debt 0.027 (.020) 0.016 (.006) 0.089 (.014)
Employed −0.097 (.020) −0.009 (.007)
Pseudo-R2 0.075 0.121 0.091
Mean = 0.27 Mean = 0.042 Mean = 0.147
Marginal Effects from probit. Bold figures are significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
constraints at all ages. This is quite natural because the for-
mer refer to the time of the interview, while the latter refer to
any time since the job loss.
To summarize the correlates of being credit constrained,
we estimated a series of probit models. We have a set of
predictor variables including just characteristics of respon-
dents and their households, as well as information on the
type of job separation and household financial circum-
stances at the time of job loss. The results are presented in
table 2.
The first column of table 2 presents empirical (probit) mod-
els of the response to the “could borrow” question. We have
coded a negative response as 1, and so these are models
of the probability that the respondent is unable to borrow.
Women are more likely to be unable to borrow, as are the
less educated and visible minorities. Households with liq-
uid assets or owning their home are more likely to be able
to borrow. The home ownership effect is partially offset by
having a mortgage. Current unemployment appears to have
an independent effect (reducing ability to borrow) even after
controlling for other factors.9 These effects are economically
significant.
In the second column of table 2 we turn from the issue of
whether a household could borrow to the issue of whether
they face (or have faced) a binding constraint. Here a respon-
dent is coded 1 if unable to borrow and would like to.
Visible minorities, those with little education, and non–home
owners are more likely to experience a binding borrowing
constraint. The presence of liquid assets does not affect the
probability of a currently binding constraint, an issue we
return to.
9 We initially split the sample into respondents who were not employed
at the interview date and those who were. Likelihood ratio tests indicated
that we could not reject pooling the employed and unemployed (allowing
for an intercept shift) in estimating the probit models reported here.
Table 3.—Comparing Direct Measures of Credit Constraints with
Asset Holdings
Observed Expected
Agreement Agreement Kappa (SE)
Correlates P0 Pe P0−Pe1−Pe
Hold no Unable to borrow 0.57 0.46 0.192 (.017)
assets, Currently constrained 0.46 0.43 0.048 (.007)
A = 0 Refused credit 0.56 0.54 0.034 (.011)
or discouraged 0.56 0.53 0.059 (.016)
Hold Unable to borrow 0.47 0.40 0.123 (.013)
assets, Currently constrained 0.31 0.29 0.025 (.005)
A < 2 ∗ y12 Refused credit 0.37 0.34 0.033 (.007)
or discouraged 0.42 0.37 0.067 (.011)
The Kappa statistic measures the extent of agreement between two different measures of a discrete
variable. Let f (x, y) be the empirical joint distribution of these two measures, x and y, which in our case
take values of 0 or 1. Let fx (x) be the empirical marginal distribution of measure x and, similarly, fy (y).
The observed proportion of agreement is P0 = f (1, 1) + f (0, 0). The expected proportion of agreement
(given the marginal distributions) is Pe = fx (1) fy (1) + fx (0) fy (0). The kappa statistic is
κ = P0 − Pe
1 − Pe .
If the two measures agree perfectly and so P0 = 1, then κ = 1. The key factor that the kappa statistic
adjusts for is that the expected proportion of agreement varies with the marginal distributions. If the observed
agreement equals the expected agreement, P0 = Pe and κ = 0. The standard errors reported (in parentheses)
assume that the measures are provided by two independent assesors, whereas in our sample, the different
measures are provided by the survey respondent. Subject to this caveat, bold indicates significance at 10%.
See also StataCorp (2009).
The third column of table 2 reports estimates of a probit
model of the alternative measure of constrained, which is
based on the objective questions (the broad measure, includ-
ing “discouraged”). Once again, the less educated and visible
minorities are more likely to be constrained. Households
with liquid assets or owning their home are less likely to
be constrained on this measure. Preexisting unsecured debt
increases the likelihood of being constrained.
A natural question is whether our measures of borrowing
constraints identify the same set of households as tradi-
tional approaches (based on wealth or liquid asset measures).
Table 3 addresses this question. We construct two measures:
whether the household had any liquid assets at all and whether
they had at least two months of usual income in liquid assets.
The latter is similar to the measure used by Zeldes (1989),
Runkle (1991), Ziliak (1998), Johnson, Parker, and Soule-
les (2006), and Leth-Peterson (2010). We construct both of
these measures at job loss and at the first interview. The first
column of table 3 gives the actual agreement between the
various measures: the fraction of the sample for which a pair
of measures takes the same values (note that all the measures
are binary). In considering the agreement between two binary
measures, it is important to note that the further the means of
the two measures are from .5, the greater the degree of agree-
ment one would expect to arise simply by chance. The second
column of table 3 gives the degree of agreement between each
pair of measures that one would expect to arise by chance.
The third column of table 3 gives the kappa statistic, which
measures the degree of actual agreement, accounting for the
degree of agreement that would arise by chance. A value
of 0 indicates the same agreement as would arise by chance.
A value of 1 indicates complete agreement. Table 3 illustrates
a statistically significant degree of agreement between all the
pairs of measures, but agreement is by no means perfect.
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Table 4.—Consumption Growth
Δ ln Ct+1
Constant −0.023 (.035) −0.015 (.035)
Age −0.098 (.027) −0.103 (.028)
Δ ln (Household size)t+1 0.310 (.100) 0.301 (.102)
Unable to borrow −0.023 (.047) −0.034 (.048)
Binding constraint 0.248 (.100) 0.271 (.103)
At = 0 0.049 (.043) 0.043 (.044)
ΔEmploymentt+1 0.077 (.041)
Number of observations 1,916 1,855
R2 0.018 0.020
Bold indicates significance at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. Age is measured in decades as
deviations from age 40. This means that the constant should be interpreted as the consumption growth rate
of a 40-year-old with no change in household size, no change in employment status, and all the dummy
variables equal to 0 (i.e., able to borrow).
Whether the household has any assets seems to be a slightly
better measure of whether they face borrowing constraints
than whether they had two months of assets. On balance,
our subjective and objective measures of borrowing con-
straints agree more strongly with each other than with the
asset measures.
B. Credit Constraints, Consumption Growth, and Financial
Hardship
The central element in our empirical analysis is to exam-
ine the consumption growth of households between the first
interview in the third quarter after job loss and second inter-
view in the fifth quarter after job loss. Consumption growth
is defined as the change in the logarithm of total expenditure.
This is divided by the number of weeks between the first and
second interview to give an annual rate. Having a measure of
total expenditure is another strong feature of these data. As
discussed in Browning and Crossley (2009), food expendi-
ture, which is used extensively in this literature, is likely to
be preferentially smoothed.10
In tables 4 and 5, we report a series of consumption growth
regressions. The first column of table 4 reports a regres-
sion of consumption growth on a constant, age, the change
in household size between the first and second interviews,
and dummy variables capturing the responses to the subjec-
tive questions regarding ability and desire to borrow at the
first interview. The subjective questions are the natural ones
to use here because of the timing: they pertain to borrow-
ing constraints at the first interview, and we are modeling
consumption growth from the first interview to the second
one.
Those who report a binding constraint (they could not
borrow but would if they could) exhibit very high con-
sumption growth. Their consumption growth is statistically
(and economically) different from the rest of the sample.
The consumption growth of those who say they could not
10 Total expenditure in the survey is measured in a single recall question.
This measure has been used in Browning and Crossley (2001, 2009). It is
validated against data from a detailed expenditure survey in Browning et al.
(2003).
borrow but are not constrained is not statistically differ-
ent from those who say they could borrow. Further, when
we control for access to credit, having no liquid wealth
(At = 0) is not a significant determinant of consumption
growth.
A possible concern here is that those facing binding
credit constraints at interview 1 are less likely to be back
in employment at interview 1 (see table 2). If leisure and
consumption are nonseparable, then differences in consump-
tion growth could be related to differences in employment
growth. This explanation of the high consumption growth
of the constrained would require that consumption and
leisure are (Frisch) substitutes (or, equivalently, that con-
sumption and employment are complements, for example,
if there are expenditures associated with working). In the
second column of table 4 we address this possibility by
augmenting the specification of the first column by condi-
tioning on employment growth. This changes the coefficients
on other variables very little; in particular, it leads to a
small increase in the difference in consumption growth rates
between those reporting a binding constraint and the rest of
the sample.
A second possible issue with the results in table 4 is
discount rate heterogeneity. As noted in section 2, a theo-
retically plausible explanation for (persistent) consumption
growth is patience: a low discount rate. However, patience
leads to wealth accumulation. As documented in tables 2 and
3, those reporting binding borrowing constraints are, condi-
tional on age, less likely to own homes and less likely to
hold liquid assets. Thus, the credit constrained are likely
to be impatient and should, if anything, have unusually
low (or even negative) consumption growth because of this
revealed desire to bring consumption forward in time. The
excess consumption growth documented in table 4 can-
not be attributed to discount rate heterogeneity. In fact, if
the credit constrained are more impatient than average, the
excess consumption growth documented in table 4 should
be taken as a lower bound for the effect of the borrowing
constraint.
In table 5 we turn to consumption growth regressions that
have the form of classic excess sensitivity tests. In particular,
we regress consumption growth (between interview 1 and 2)
on a constant, age, the change in household size, and the
logarithm of lagged income (income at interview 1). The
idea is that to the extent that it is in the information set at the
first interview, lagged income should not predict consumption
growth between the first and second interview.
Starting with the first column and moving right, we esti-
mate this model on increasingly selected samples. The first
column reports estimates for the whole sample, the second
column excludes just those who report a binding constraint,
and the estimates in the third column exclude all those who
report being unable to borrow. Thus, this table examines
how consumption growth varies with lagged income “within
group.” Here our empirical strategy is very similar to that of
Jappelli et al. (1998) except that we have exact (rather than
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Table 5.—Consumption Growth within Groups
Δ ln Ct+1
Without Without
Binding Able to Binding Able to
Sample All Constraint Borrow All Constraint Borrow
Constant 0.004 −0.0020 −0.0088 0.008 0.002 0.0145
(.027) (.021) (.025) (.021) (.022) (.0259)
Age −0.103 −0.096 −0.100 −0.108 −0.101 −0.104
(.027) (.028) (.032) (.028) (.028) (.033)
Δ ln (Hhd Size) 0.292 0.280 0.347 0.284 0.262 0.317
(.100) (.107) (.122) (.103) (.109) (.127)
ln yt −0.071 −0.070 −0.078 −0.065 −0.059 −0.069
(.037) (.037) (.044) (.038) (.039) (.045)
ΔParticipation 0.064 0.069 0.049
(.041) (.043) (.051)
Number of observations 1,865 1,798 1,375 1,865 1,798 1,375
R2 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018
Bold indicates significance at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. Age is measured in decades as deviations from age 40. ln yt is normalized so that it has mean 0. This means that the constant should be interpreted
as the consumption growth rate of a 40-year-old with no change in household size, no change in employment status, and average lagged income.
imputed) information on borrowing constraints.11 Columns
4 through 6 repeat the pattern of columns 1 through 3, while
augmenting the regression specification with employment
growth to allow for leisure nonseparabilities.
The first column of table 5 indicates statistically (and
economically) significant excess sensitivity in our full sam-
ple. The fourth column shows that this result is robust to
conditioning on employment growth to capture leisure non-
separabilities. The second column shows that the excess
sensitivity of consumption growth to lagged income remains
when we delete those reporting a binding constraint from
the sample, and column 3 indicates that it remains even
when we delete all those who report they could not
borrow. Thus, we find excess sensitivity of consumption
growth to lagged income that cannot be explained by
either labor nonseparabilities or currently binding credit
constraints.
However, it is important to consider the magnitudes of
these effects. In our sample, the standard deviation of the
logarithm of lagged income is 0.6. The coefficients on the log-
arithm of lagged income in columns 1 through 3 are between
−0.07 and −0.08. Thus, a 1 standard deviation decrease in
income at interview 1 raises subsequent consumption growth
by 4 or 5 logarithm points. In contrast, in table 4, the differ-
ence between the consumption growth rate of those reporting
a binding borrowing constraint and the rest of the sample
is 25 logarithm points, or five to six times as large. Thus,
the variation in consumption growth rates across groups
(constrained versus unconstrained) is much larger than the
variation with lagged income within groups. Really rapid
consumption growth, and hence very large welfare losses,
are associated with binding credit constraints.
11 In addition, Japelli et al. (1998) estimate a switching model, so there
is a test for excess sensitivity in both the imputed constrained and imputed
unconstrained groups. Sample size precludes us from estimating the regres-
sion within the reported constrained group in a parallel fashion. While our
overall sample is of reasonable size, there are simply too few households
that report a binding constraint.
Table 6.—Financial Hardship on Job Loss
Raw
Proportion Probit Marginal Effects
No credit demand 0.519 (omitted group)
Successful applicant 0.556 0.037 0.029
(.032) (.034)
Unsuccessful applicant 0.755 0.231 0.190
(.045) (.050)
Discouraged 0.807 0.280 0.242
(.037) (.017)
Controls − None Full
Number of observations 1,477
R2 0.027 0.080
Association of Self Reported Financial Hardship (Resulting from Job Loss) with credit status. Raw
percentages and marginal effects from probit. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold indicates significance
at 10%. “No credit demand” means did not apply for credit (between job loss and first interview) and not
discouraged. The full set of controls is the set used in table 2: gender, a spline in age, education dummies,
spouse present, children present, visible minority, reason for job loss (quit, fired, ill health), home ownership,
outstanding mortgage, spouse employed, liquid assets, other debt, and whether employed.
Following the theoretical discussion in section 2, we have
interpreted the high consumption growth rates of those report-
ing binding borrowing constraints as indicating significant
welfare losses. Our data contain self-reports (at the first inter-
view, three quarters after job loss) of whether the job loss
was associated with financial hardship.12 We now use these
reports as the second assessment of the costs of a binding bor-
rowing constraint. Table 6 reports estimates of probit models
for this binary outcome (where a 1 indicates that the job loss
was associated with financial hardship and a 0 otherwise.)
We relate this outcome to measures of credit constraints and
other characteristics of the respondent and her household.
(The additional controls are the same as in table 2.)
We focus here on the objective credit constraint measures
as these pertain to the whole period between the job loss
and the first interview (as opposed to a point in time). We
use these to divide our sample into four groups: those who
had no credit demand (neither applied nor discouraged), suc-
cessful applicants, unsuccessful applicants, and those who
12 The question was: “Has the loss of the job on [DATE] been a financial
hardship for your household?”
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were discouraged from applying by the expectation of being
declined. Following table 1, those in the latter two groups
are considered to have experienced a binding borrowing
constraint.
The first column shows the raw fractions reporting finan-
cial hardship in the four groups. These are substantially
higher in the constrained groups (unsuccessful applicants and
discouraged). The second column shows the marginal effects
from a probit with no additional controls (just the group dum-
mies). This shows that the differences in the prevalence of
financial hardship between constrained and unconstrained
groups are statistically significant. In the third column, we add
additional controls. This leads to little change in the marginal
effects (or their statistical significance). Thus, experienc-
ing a binding borrowing constraint is associated with very
rapid subsequent consumption growth and a much greater
probability of reporting that the job loss was a financial
hardship.
V. Conclusion
Borrowing constraints can generate consumption growth
by two distinct mechanisms: currently binding borrowing
constraints may lower current consumption directly, while
the possibility of binding constraints in the future can lower
current consumption by raising the value of precautionary
saving. Unusually rich data have allowed us to assess the
relative importance of these channels for recent job losers.
Our analysis reveals that a small fraction of job losers (less
than one in six) experiences a binding borrowing constraint
in the year after job loss. Relative to all job losers, this group
has lower education and is more likely to belong to a visible
minority. They subsequently exhibit very rapid consumption
growth. We interpret this as a failure to smooth consumption,
with significant welfare costs. This interpretation is corrobo-
rated by self-reports of financial hardship associated with job
loss.
Among job losers, excess sensitivity of consumption to
current income is not limited to those who report a binding
borrowing constraint. However, the difference in consump-
tion growth rates between the constrained and unconstrained
group is an order of magnitude larger than the excess sen-
sitivity in the latter group. The largest welfare losses are
overwhelmingly concentrated among the small group who
hit a binding constraint.
We would expect the incidence of borrowing constraints
to be higher among job losers than among those in continu-
ing employment; consistent with this, we find that for recent
job losers, failure to obtain rapid reemployment is a signifi-
cant predictor of experiencing a binding constraint. However,
even among this group, the fraction who experience a binding
constraint is small. The very rapid consumption growth of
this small group as they recover from job loss suggests a
failure of private and public smoothing mechanisms and sig-
nificant welfare losses. At a macrolevel, this group is likely to
be small and account for very little of aggregate wealth and
consumption. To understand the importance of credit con-
straints more generally, we would need information on other
groups where such constraints may be important, such as
the self-employed, and at points in the life cycle when con-
straints were more likely to be binding, such as among college
attendees.
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